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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Regina Amelia Maynard appeals from the judgment of conviction entered upon
the jury verdict finding her guilty of manufacturing marijuana, trafficking in marijuana,
possession of marijuana with the intent to deliver, possession of methamphetamine,
and possession of drug paraphernalia.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
Regina Maynard ("Maynard") was charged in Ada County District Court with
(Count I) manufacturing a controlled substance; (Count 11) trafficking in marijuana;
(Count 111) possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver; (Count IV)
possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine); and (Count V) possession of
drug paraphernalia.

(R., pp.45-47.) Following a jury trial, Maynard was convicted of

each of those five counts. (R., pp.209-210.) Maynard was sentenced as follows:
Count I:

an indeterminate five-year term with zero years fixed, consecutive
to Count II;

Count II:

a unified five-year sentence with two years fixed;

Count Ill:

a unified five-year sentence with two years fixed, concurrent with
Count II;

Count IV:

a unified seven-year sentence with two years fixed, concurrent with
Counts II and Ill; and

Count V:

one year in the Ada County Jail, concurrent with Counts II, Ill, and
IV.

(R., pp.227-231.) Maynard filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.233-236.)

1

ISSUES
Maynard states the issues on appeal as: .
1.
Did the prosecutor commit misconduct when it introduced prejudicial
evidence of a type that the State had previously stipulated not to introduce to the
jury, and did the district court err when it denied Ms. Maynard's motion for a
mistrial that was prompted by this misconduct?
2.
Did the district court err when it precluded Ms. Maynard from crossexamining one of the State's key witnesses about the potential penalties of the
criminal charges that witness was currently facing?
3.

Does the cumulative effect of these errors require reversal in this case?

(Appellant's Brief, p.16.)
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1. Has Maynard failed to show the district court erred by denying her motion for
mistrial?
2. Is Maynard precluded by the invited error doctrine from challenging on appeal a
ruling she agreed with at trial?
3. Has Maynard failed to show that the cumulative error doctrine applies to this case?

2

ARGUMENT
I.
Maynard Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred By Denying Her Motion For
Mistrial

A

Introduction
On appeal, Maynard asserts the district court committed reversible error when it

denied her motion for a mistrial after the state violated its stipulation that it "would refrain
'from presenting evidence that Ms. Maynard was pushing a baby stroller outside of her
home when she was initially confronted by police." 1 (Appellant's Brief, p.17.) Maynard
specifically argues that her being seen "pushing a baby stroller right outside of her
home immediately prior to its search by police and the subsequent discovery of an
extensive marijuana grow operation inside the home, could have reasonably resulted in
prejudice in this case." (Id.)
Maynard's claim fails as a matter of law and because, when viewed in the
context of the entire trial record, there is no reasonable possibility that the challenged
question or answer constituted reversible error. Officer Holtry's brief comment that a
detective "observed a female that was at the house with a baby stroller" (Tr., p.416,
Ls.11-14) just before the search warrant was executed was harmless and did not
compromise Maynard's right to a fair trial.

1

Officer Holtry's actual comment at trial was:
There was a - one of our detectives was conducting surveillance
while we were sort of getting ready. Then he observed a female that was
at the house with a baby stroller.

(Tr., p.416, Ls.11-14.)
3

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review applicable to the refusal of a trial court to grant a mistrial

upon a motion in a criminal case is well established:
[T]he question on appeal is not whether the trial judge reasonably
exercised his discretion in light of circumstances existing when the mistrial
motion was made. Rather, the question must be whether the event which
precipitated the motion for mistrial represented reversible error when
viewed in the context of the full record. Thus, where a motion for mistrial
has been denied in a criminal case, the 'abuse of discretion' standard is a
misnomer. The standard, more accurately stated, is one of reversible
error. [The appellate court's] focus is upon the continuing impact on the
trial of the incident that triggered the mistrial motion. The trial judge's
refusal to declare a mistrial will be disturbed only if that incident, viewed
retrospectively, constituted reversible error.
State v. Grantham, 146 Idaho 490, 498, 198 P.3d 128, 136 (Ct. App. 2008) (quoting
State v. Urguhart, 105 Idaho 92, 95, 665 P.2d 1102, 1105 (Ct. App. 1983)). Because
the right to due process guarantees only a fair trial, not an error-free one, "error is not
reversible unless it is shown to be prejudicial." Grantham, 146 Idaho at 498, 198 P.3d
at 136 (citing State v. Shepherd, 124 Idaho 54, 57,855 P.2d 891,894 (Ct. App. 1993)).
"Error will be deemed harmless if the appellate court is able to declare, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that there was no reasonable possibility that the evidence
complained of contributed to the conviction." 2 Shepherd, 124 Idaho at 58, 855 P.2d at
895 (citations omitted).

2

Maynard's reliance upon Roll v. City of Middleton, 115 Idaho 833, 837, 771 .2d 54, 58
(Ct. App. 1989), in arguing for the lower standard of whether the improper evidence
"reasonably could have resulted in prejudice" is misplaced. (See Appellant's Brief,
p.22.) Roll clarified that, in cases involving allegations of jury misconduct under I.R.C.P.
59(a), the standard to be met is "whether prejudice reasonably could have occurred,
rather than whether prejudice actually has occurred." There was no claim of jury
4

C.

The District Court Correctly Concluded That The Testimony Upon Which
Maynard's Motion For Mistrial Was Predicated Did Not Warrant A Mistrial
In the context of the entire record, the unsolicited 3 testimony by Officer Holtry

that, just prior to executing a search warrant on Maynard's house, a detective "observed
a female that was at the house with a baby stroller" (Tr., p.416, Ls.9-14), does not
amount to reversible error, but is a defect that has little, if any, likelihood of having
changed the result of the trial.
Assuming, arguendo, the officer's testimony that a detective saw a woman with a
baby stroller at the house just before the search warrant was executed was
inadmissible, the admission of improper evidence does not automatically require the
declaration of a mistrial. See, M., State v. Rose, 125 Idaho 266, 269, 869 P.2d 583,
586 (Ct. App. 1994). Idaho Criminal Rule 52 provides "[a]ny error, defect, irregularity, or
variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded." Therefore, a
new trial is unnecessary if the error was harmless. State v. Scovell, 136 Idaho 587,
593, 38 P.3d 625, 631 (Ct. App. 2001 ). "The test for harmless error ... is whether a
reviewing court can find beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have reached
the same result without the admission of the challenged evidence." State v. Moore, 131
Idaho 814,821, 965 P.2d 174, 181 (1998); State v. Slater, 136 Idaho 293, 300, 32 P.3d
685, 692 (Ct. App. 2001).

misconduct in Maynard's trial. See State v. Seiber, 117 Idaho 637, 639-640, 791 P.2d
18, 20-21 (Ct. App. 1989) (explaining that Roll expanded upon the court"s responsibility
for determining the effects of juror misconduct).
3

Not only was the officer's testimony unsolicited, he was specifically warned by the
prosecutor not to make mention that a woman was seen pushing a baby stroller outside
the house just before the search warrant was executed. (Tr., p.155, Ls.17-21.)
5

Officer Holtry's single, brief remark that a detective "observed a female that was
at the house with a baby stroller" prior to the execution of the search warrant was not
prejudicial in light of the admissible testimony showing Maynard's guilt. It is unlikely the
officer's isolated comment had any impact, much less a continuing one, on the trial,
particularly when viewed in the context of the full record.

Further, the statement was

certainly not the type of evidence that would prevent this Court from concluding,
"beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was no reasonable possibility that the evidence
complained of contributed to the conviction." Shepherd, 124 Idaho at 58, 855 P.2d at
895 (citations omitted).
Consistent with this conclusion, Maynard's trial counsel apparently found the
brief statement by the officer was not sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a limiting or
curative instruction given that he declined the court's offer to give such an instruction.
(Tr., p.456, Ls.1-8.) Despite counsel's claim that such an instruction would draw more
attention to the allegedly improper testimony (Tr., p.456, Ls.1-8), Maynard's decision not
to do so is relevant in light of the Court of Appeals' recognition in Grantham, that
"[w]here improper testimony is inadvertently introduced into a trial and the trial court
promptly instructs the jury to disregard such evidence, it is ordinarily presumed that the
jury obeyed the court's instruction entirely." 146 Idaho at 498, 198 P.3d at 136 (citation
omitted). Thus, the Court will "normally presume that a jury will follow an instruction to
disregard inadmissible evidence inadvertently presented to it, unless there is an
overwhelming probability that the jury will be unable to follow the court's instructions,
and a strong likelihood that the effect of the evidence would be devastating to the
defendant."

~

Maynard should not be able to bolster his claim of prejudice on appeal
6

as a result of his decision at trial to decline the court's invitation to instruct the jury that
the evidence he complains of should not be considered.
Maynard's contention that she has shown prejudice sufficient to warrant reversal
is based upon the following argument:
The evidence that was improperly presented to the jury in this case,
i.e. that Ms. Maynard was pushing a baby stroller right outside of her
home immediately prior to its search by police and the subsequent
discovery of an extensive marijuana grow operation inside the home,
could have reasonably resulted in prejudice in this case. Upon hearing
this evidence, the jurors would naturally conclude that Ms. Maynard had
exposed a small child to an environment where drugs were being grown,
and this would likely incite the passions and prejudice of the jurors. This is
the type of evidence that could have therefore prevented the jury from
engaging in a rational consideration of the evidence, and would tend to
induce the jury to render its decision based upon factors outside of the
evidence.
(Appellant's Brief, p.23 (emphasis added).)
compelling.

Maynard's prejudice argument is not

It is based upon an incorrect legal standard of whether the improper

evidence "could have reasonably resulted in prejudice" (see n. 2, supra), and is riddled
with speculation as to how a jury might have reacted to Officer Holtry's comment.
Maynard has failed to show that the jury would have been prejudiced in any way simply
by being told that, just before the house was searched pursuant to a warrant, a woman
was seen at the house with a baby stroller. It is pure conjecture on Maynard's part that
the jury would have been incited by a woman who may (or may not) have been seen
with a baby stroller shortly before the search warrant was executed. Such a conclusion
rests on the jury first believing that Maynard was a participant in the marijuana growing
operation.

It is just as likely that the jury's conclusion that the baby stroller was

occupied by a child of Maynard would result in sympathy towards her as a mother of a
7

young child and cause doubt about her participation in the marijuana growing operation.
Maynard's argument assumes that the jury would have reacted to Officer Holtry's
testimony in the most imaginably damaging way possible, instead of following the
court's instructions that the jury was required to base its verdicts solely on whether,
based on the evidence presented at trial, the state proved each element of each crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. (See R., pp.175 (Jury Inst. No. 5), 177-178 (Jury Instr. No.
7), 185 (Jury Instr. No. 13), 186 (Jury Instr. No. 14), 188 (Jury Instr. No. 16), 189 (Jury
Instr. No. 17).)

Maynard has failed to show that the officer's comment would have

prejudiced the jury against her in any way.
Moreover, in viewing the entire record as a whole, there is no indication that
Officer Holtry's comment would have affected the guilty verdicts; the jury would have
returned the same guilty verdicts had it not heard the question. A brief review of the trial
record shows the evidence demonstrating Maynard's guilt was, to say the least,
overwhelming.
On September 23, 2010, upon executing a search warrant for Maynard and her
mother's three bedroom Boise residence, Boise Police Department officers discovered
an active marijuana growing operation in two of the bedrooms.
p.186, L.8; p.190, L.5 - p.191, L.16; p.192, Ls.4-15.)

(Tr., p.185, L.25 -

In what was designated as

"bedroom A," officers found lights with reflective hoods, walls with silver reflective
panels, drying racks with marijuana plants on them, blowers, timers, a CO2 sensor, and
ten marijuana plants. (Tr., p.420, L.8 - p.421, L. 18; p.427, Ls.8-11.) In "bedroom B,"
officers discovered fans that were running, lights, a drip system, a watering system, a
drying area with a rack containing harvested marijuana buds, potting soil, and 31
8

marijuana plants.

(Tr., p.464, L6 - p. 465, L.6; p.474, Ls.19-20.)

On top of a

"harvesting or processing table" in bedroom B, officer's found a handwritten note or
ledger entitled "Grow Log" that had instructions about watering and feeding marijuana
plants.

(Tr., p.487, L.12 - p.489, L.2; St. Ex. 9.)

In Maynard's master bedroom,

"bedroom C," officer's found two brown vials of methamphetamine (one on a shelf in the
closet and the other in a jewelry box on a nightstand by the bed), a marijuana "bong," a
shake box (used to clean marijuana), a large digital scale with residue on it in a dresser
at the foot of the bed, several baggies inside a dresser (one with a substantial amount
of marijuana inside), a small set of portable digital scales inside a dresser, rolling papers
and a small rolling device, and some books on growing marijuana on the nightstand by
the bed. (Tr., p.375, L.22 - p.380, L.7; p.384, L.14 - p.392, L.18.)
After being placed under arrest, Maynard was interviewed at the scene by Officer
Andreoli, and informed him that the plants inside the residence were marijuana plants,
the two vials found in her bedroom were methamphetamine, the idea to have a
marijuana grow operation was hers, and that the operation began in the summer. (Tr.,
p.203, Ls.1-13; St. Ex. 2, Track 2, 02:50 - 05:25; Track 3, 00:01 - 00:24.) Maynard
explained that she had allowed a male friend (eventually identified as "Freddie") to start
the marijuana growing operation and that a couple days before the search warrant was
executed he told her "everything needs to go right now," and he took half or most of
everything, and what was left was going to be hers. (St. Ex. 2, Track 2, 08:55 - 09:04.)
While in jail, Maynard had two phone conversations with an unidentified male
which were recorded and played for the jury at trial.

{St. Ex. 18.)

During the first

conversation, Maynard said she was stupid, and when the male said he didn't know
9

what she was thinking, she responded, "I was just trying to [inaudible] if I could make
some money." (St. Ex. 18, Track 1, 01 :48 - 02:08.) In the second call, Maynard said,
"[W]ell, I wasn't thinking straight, you know, when [inaudible] comes along and is telling
you that they're gonna give you a huge amount of money you don't really think straight."
(St. Ex. 18, Track 2, 01 :25 - 01 :45.) When the male asked Maynard why she did not get
any part of the money, she explained that it was because "it wasn't done." (Id., 01 :46 01 :52.) The male on the phone asked Maynard whether the man paid for her power bill
or anything, and she responded that he was going to when everything was done. (Id.
01 :53 - 01 :59.)
Christine Maynard testified that she had lived with her daughter, Maynard, and
during the summer of 2010, Maynard approached her about a friend who wanted to use
their residence for growing marijuana. (Tr., p.608, Ls.3-11; p.609, Ls.4-7; p.610, Ls.2124.) Maynard told Christine that, in return for allowing the marijuana growing operation
to be at her house, she expected to be able to catch up on her rent and bills, have the
possible use of the friend's car and computer, and have a small amount of marijuana
left for her personal use.

(Tr., p.610, L.25 - p.611, L.7; p.612, Ls.6-9.)

Christine

testified that between August and September, she saw Maynard enter the grow rooms
in the house a couple of times, and also saw "Fred" go into the rooms to attend to the
equipment.

Finally, Christine testified that the handwriting on the ledger or log for

feeding and watering marijuana (St. Ex. 9) appeared to match Maynard's handwriting
for the entries above and including the entry of "6/2." (Tr., p.633, L.5 - p.634, L.7.)
Maynard's own trial testimony was incredibly damaging to her case.

She

explained that she met "Freddie" on Craigslist in response to an employment ad, and
10

worked for him as a cocktail waitress during private poker games and cleaned his house
afterwards. (Tr., p.673, L.19 - p.674, L.23.) Maynard knew that Freddie had marijuana
plants at his house. (Tr., p.697, L.22 - 698, L.1.) In August, 2010, Freddie asked her if
he could move his marijuana growing operation to her house, and after he told her he
would help pay her rent, she and her mother agreed to the arrangement. (Tr., p.675,
L.20 - 677, Ls.13-15; p.698, Ls.7-19.) Maynard was unemployed during the summer of
2010 and owed about $3,000 in back rent and over $1,600 in power bills. (Tr., p.689,
Ls.20-21; p.701, Ls.13-23.) Maynard and her mother allowed Freddie to: bring all his
marijuana growing equipment into their home; hang fans and lights from the ceiling;
plaster tin foil on the walls; cut holes in the walls; access water from the washer and
dryer to provide water to the plants; and bring fertilizers and potting soil into the house.
(Tr., p.679, L20 - p.680, L.3; p.698, L.24 - p.699, L.22.) Moreover, Maynard provided
Freddie with a key to her house. (Tr., p.679, Ls.14-17.) Maynard also explained to the
jury that she smoked marijuana about four times a week during the summer of 2010,
using about one-eighth of an ounce of marijuana weekly, but did not smoke any
marijuana that was from the growing operation. (Tr., p.681, Ls.3-22; p.692, Ls. 3-6.)
In sum, the evidence presented at trial showing
overwhelming.

Maynard's guilt was

Based on the amount of evidence supporting the jury's verdict, this

Court can conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the result of Maynard's trial would
not have been different absent the officer's ill-advised comment. State v. Pecor, 132
Idaho 359, 368, 972 P.2d 737, 746 (Ct. App. 1998). The district court correctly denied
Maynard's motion for a mistrial.
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11.
Maynard Is Precluded By The Invited Error Doctrine From Challenging On Appeal A
Ruling She Agreed With At Trial
A.

Introduction
Maynard asserts that the district court committed reversible error when it "ruled

that she could not cross-examine Christine Maynard regarding the potential penalties
she was then facing at the time she testified on behalf of the State." (Appellant's Brief,
p.24.) Because a review of the record shows that Maynard actually agreed with the
district court's ruling precluding questions to witnesses about possible penalties,
Maynard's claim is barred by the doctrine of invited error.

B.

Maynard Cannot Assert As Error On Appeal A Ruling To Which She Agreed
"The doctrine of invited error applies to estop a party from asserting an error

when his or her own conduct induces the commission of the error." State v. Norton, 151
Idaho 176, _ , 254 P.3d 77, 88 (Ct. App. 2011) (citing State v. Atkinson, 124 Idaho
816, 819, 864 P.2d 654, 657 (Ct. App. 1993)). "One may not complain of errors one
has consented to or acquiesced in." Norton, 151 Idaho at_, 254 P.3d at 88 (citing
State v. Caudill, 109 Idaho 222, 226, 706 P.2d 456, 460 (1985); State v. Lee, 131 Idaho
600, 605, 961 P.2d 1203, 1208 (Ct. App. 1998)). These principles apply equally in
cases of alleged instructional error. In other words, an "'[a]ppellant cannot assert as
error on appeal the giving of an instruction which he himself requested."'
Draper, _

State v.

P.3d _ , 2011 WL 4030069, *11 (2011) (quoting State v. Aragon, 107

Idaho 358, 363, 690 P.2d 293, 298 (1984)). A review of the record in this case shows
that Maynard's claim of error is barred under the doctrine of invited error.
12

Just before Maynard's trial commenced, the prosecutor made a motion in limine
which was discussed as follows:
But I would just ask the court - the issue of penalty is not an issue in this
case.
So bringing up potential penalties or prison penalties, things like
that - the State would ask for that admonishment. I don't think it's
relevant.
And all that does is simply incite the jury's passions toward the
defendant. So I would ask that any mention of that not be permitted. And
I think that's consistent with case law in Idaho.
THE COURT: [DEFENSE COUNSEL]?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I'm aware of the rules, Judge.
THE COURT: Okay. I would order that that not be brought up to the jury.
Obviously, they will be instructed accordingly.
(Tr., p.28, L.18 - p.29, L.6.)
During the cross-examination of Christine Maynard, the following colloquy took
place:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay. And, right now, you are facing charges
for manufacturing marijuana, trafficking in marijuana, and intent to deliver
marijuana; correct?
I thought my charges were manufacturing, trafficking, and felony
possession.

A.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:

Okay. If that's what you remember, that's fine.

But you are aware that trafficking in marijuana has a mandatory
minimum[PROSECUTOR]:

Objection.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: -- prison sentence of one -

13

(Tr., p.641, Ls.12-23.) The prosecutor informed the district court that his objection was
"with regard to this court's pretrial orders," and after defense counsel contended the
prosecutor "opened the door wide when he talked about consideration for this witness
and testimony," the jury was excused for further argument on the objection. (Tr., p.641,
L.25 - p.642, L.13.) Defense counsel then argued:
Judge, he opened the door. He questioned this witness and said,
"Do you hope for any consideration or anything else?"
They elicited the fact that she was not promised anything. But
under 607-611 (b), we can go into motive, bias, and everything else for this
witness testifying the way she is.
Since the State brought up the fact that she has made other
charges and implicit in that it that she intends to plead guilty and she
testified here today that she's hoping for some consideration, we can go
into what that consideration is.
I agree with [the prosecutor] that, if they had not mentioned that, we
could not go into this; but now we clearly can. It would be a violation of
due process if we are not allowed to examine this witness for all of her
motive, bias, and any interest she has in her testimony here.

(Tr., p.642, L.14 - p.643, L.3 (emphasis added).)
The above statement by Maynard's trial counsel shows that he was not objecting
on the basis that he was entitled to cross-examine Christine Maynard about the
potential penalties she was facing.

Instead, he agreed with the prosecutor that the

subject of penalties was a prohibited area, but contended that because the prosecutor
broached the prohibited subject, the door was open for him to do likewise.
The prosecutor denied that he had opened the door to the subject of penalties,
explaining he had simply asked Christine Maynard "whether or not she faced any
charges" (Tr., p.643, Ls.12-13.) When Maynard's trial counsel repeated his claim that
14

"[t]hey opened the door, Judge," the judge stated, "[t]hat was my prior order. We were
not going to get into potential penalties." (Tr., p.643, Ls.22-24.) Maynard's attorney
again agreed with the district court's ruling that the subject of penalties was off-limits,
but asserted that the prosecutor had opened the door to that prohibited subject:
And I agree, Judge, and we would have abided by that order until
the State opened the door. When they opened the door, we can go into it.
We are allowed to examine this witness on motive and bias.
(Tr., p.643, L.25 - p.644, L.3.)
Maynard argues that the district court erred in ruling she could not cross-examine
Christine Maynard about the potential penalties she was then facing at the time she
testified on behalf of the State." (Appellant's Brief, p.24.) Maynard fails to point out
what the record affirmatively shows; (a) that Maynard specifically agreed that the
subject of penalties was properly prohibited by the district court, and (b) that her
insistence on cross-examining her mother about penalties was based only on the
assertion that the prosecutor opened the door to that line of questioning.
On appeal, Maynard does not challenge the district court's determination that the
prosecution did not open the door for her to question Christine Maynard about the
mandatory minimum penalty she was facing. Because Maynard chose, as a matter of
trial strategy, to agree with the district court's determination that questions concerning
penalties were inadmissible, and instead argued that the prosecutor opened the door for
her to do so, she is barred by the invited error doctrine 'from challenging the court's
ruling on appeal.
Even if this Court were to determine that the district court erred in not permitting
Maynard to cross-examine Christine Maynard about the penalties she was facing in her
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criminal case, in light of the full record and the overwhelming evidence presented at trial
proving her guilt, any such error would be harmless. "The inquiry is whether, beyond a
reasonable doubt, a rational jury would have convicted [the defendant] even without the
admission of the challenged evidence." State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 669, 227
P.3d 918, 923 (2010) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); Neder v.
United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999)). The state relies upon the facts set forth in Issue
I, supra, to show that, absent any testimony by Christine Maynard, the evidence
showing Maynard's guilt was so extensive that this Court can easily conclude that,
beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury would have convicted Maynard on all counts.

111.
Maynard Has Failed To Show That The Cumulative Error Doctrine Applies To This
Case
Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of errors, harmless in
themselves, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial. State v. Martinez,
125 Idaho 445, 453, 872 P.2d 708, 716 (1994). A necessary predicate to application of
the doctrine is a finding of more than one error. State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 958
P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 1998). Maynard has failed to show that two or more errors occurred
in her trial, and therefore the doctrine is inapplicable to this case. See, ~ . LaBelle v.
State, 130 Idaho 115, 121, 937 P.2d 427, 433 (Ct. App. 1997). Even if errors in the trial
had been shown, they would not amount to a denial of due process that would require
reversal. State v. Gray. 129 Idaho 784, 804, 932 P.2d 907, 927 (Ct. App. 1997); State
v. Barcella, 135 Idaho 191, 204, 16 P.3d 288, 301 (Ct. App. 2000) (accumulation of
errors deemed harmless).
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Maynard's convictions and
sentences.
DATED this 24th day of August, 2012.
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